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Imperial Ethiopia:
Conquest and the Case of National Articulation
By: Hawi Tilahune
Introduction
Much of the literature on state-building draws inspiration from the American sociologist
Charles Tilly’s Bellicist perspective (Centeno 2002; Thies 2005). The bellicist account or the
predatory theory speaks to the earlier European state-formation. In Tilly’s renowned aphorism:
“War made the state, and the state made war” (quoted in Taylor and Botea 2008: 27). Based on an
extensive and comprehensive historical analysis of modern European states, the Bellicist
perspective presents war as the primary and central stimulus to building a centralized state
apparatus (Thies 2009: 625). The defining factor for state-building is the state’s capacity to wage
war and its ability to penetrate society to extract revenues and resources. More precisely, state
building is a process by which states develop the capacity to control, extract and regulate society
while commanding a level of legitimacy. The process of extraction is needed in order to build the
capacity of the state and to develop its administrative institutions (Kisangani 2014: 2). In addition,
the collection of revenues and the building of a centralized state infrastructure are assumed to also
facilitate a national identity and “other informal and formal features of modern states” (Thies 2009:
625).
As part of this effort to consolidate their authority, “wielders of coercion” (Leander 2004: 4)
become responsible for what Tilly and other bellicist scholars identify as war-making (eliminating
or neutralizing external enemies), state-making (eliminating or neutralizing internal enemies),
protection (securing allies internally) and extraction (securing the means to facilitate the abovementioned processes through capital accumulation) (Tilly 1985: 181). These interrelated processes
yield organizational features that constitute the modern characteristics of a centralized nation-

state. In view of Tilly’s predatory theory, I argue that two factors precipitated the nation-state
articulation process of Ethiopia: European imperialism in the Horn and Abyssinian conquest of the
periphery. Further adding to the literature, I also draw attention to the cultural conditions and the
social “storytelling” that underlines the political economy of state-consolidation. First, I will
evaluate the bellicist account and the processes that are central in defining state-formation. Before
assessing the relevance of Tilly’s bellicist account, I will provide justification for my emphasis on
the study of war and the field of cultural political economy in the second and third sections. These
sections provide the conceptual tools to further highlight the relevance of the bellicist account to
Ethiopia. My fourth section seeks to justify the study of war, relevant in the Bellicist account and
particularly, in the state formation processes of Ethiopia. To evaluate these assertions, I locate the
historical frontier of Ethiopia during the reign of Menelik II1 (1889-1913). Followed by the discussion
on the case study, I will conclude with important insights and further implications of this research.
Understanding the Bellicist Perspective
The bellicist account, otherwise known as the predatory theory, documents early European
state-formation. Based on an extensive historical analysis of modern European states, the bellicist
perspective reinstates war as the central means of extraction, critical in building a centralized state
apparatus (Thies 2009: 625). In other words, the predatory theory treats war as the primary vehicle
for institutional development, in which the need to extract resources necessitates the
establishment of centralized state institutions. The defining factor of state-building is the state’s
ability to penetrate society to capital. These assets are crucial in order to build the capacity of the
state and to develop its administrative institutions (Kisangani 2014: 2). Tilly analogizes this process
of Western European state-formation in the sixteenth and seventeenth century to an “organized
1

Menelik II is renowned as the founding father of modern Ethiopia (Crummey 2000: 215). He was the King of Shewa
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crime” (Tilly 1985) involving three interrelated processes: war-making, extraction and capital
accumulation (Tilly 1985: 172).
Tilly uses the analogy of criminal protection rackets to explain the dynamics of earlymodern European state formation. Through the racketeering analogy, he demonstrates that state
leaders, like criminal syndicates, create threats that only they can mitigate—for a price. The
interdependent processes of war-making and state-making thereby function as “protection rackets”
to secure power for the state-builders (Tilly 1985: 169). As the state sells security in exchange for
revenues, it develops organized means for coercive extraction and protection. Many governments
could be said to operate as racketeers since “the repressive and extractive activities of governments
often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens” (Tilly 1985: 171).
Though Tilly is drawing parallels between organized crime racketeering and state-building, rulers
do not set out to run crime syndicates. Instead, they often produce danger while also providing a
shield against it (Tilly 1985: 171).
As part of this effort to consolidate authority, “wielders of coercion” (Leander 2004: 4)
become responsible for what Tilly and other bellicist scholars identify as war-making, state-making,
protection and extraction (Tilly 1985: 181). These interrelated processes yield organizational
features, which constitute the modern characteristics of a centralized nation-state. It is critical to
note that power holders did not engage in the war-making, extraction and capital accumulation
processes to construct the nation-state; instead, nation-states became the by-products of securing
power and exercising authority in expanded territories through war-making.
War-making, which involves establishing a monopoly over the means of coercion to fight
against outside intruders or enemies, calls for the establishment of a standing army and related
mechanisms and organizations (Tilly 1985: 181). Waging war is a costly and requires great
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investment of human and financial capital. In order to secure resources for war, European rulers
had to locate and secure capital through outright conquest, selling assets or forcefully dispossessing
those having command over capital (Tilly 1985: 172). What this produced in the long-term was
organized systems that ensured “regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit”
and regular forms of taxation within a particular territory (Tilly 1985: 172). Through this process,
state-builders built administrative capacity and state bureaucracies that allowed them to map their
territories and gather needed information for capital accumulation (Robinson 2002: 512). European
rulers often provided ways to protect inside supporters. Institutions such as courts and assemblies
took shape in the processes of guaranteeing demanded protection by the ruled (Tilly 1985: 181). The
more costly the war-making activity, all other variables equal, “the greater the organizational
residue” (Tilly 1985: 181).
Competition over territory and capital provided by war-making led to the unintended
consequence of the state or the development of state-apparatus (Leander 2004: 4). Before the
French Revolution, Tilly notes that the use of local magnates as indirect rulers was key in ensuring
protection and governance among European provinces. These magnates “collaborated with the
government without becoming officials in any strong sense of the term, had some access to
government backed force, and exercised wide discretion within their own territories” (Tilly 1985:
174). However, the state magnates also were potential enemies and possible allies of opposition in
the region (Tilly 1985: 174). Thus, the use of indirect-rule decreased with two distinct strategies: (1)
dispatching officials to local provinces and communities (2) Encouraging the build-up of
subordinate police forces (Tilly 1985: 174). In the earlier European experience, supporters of the
state, which carried out the protective and extractive processes for state consolidation, were
generally “landlords, armed retainers of the monarch, and churchmen” (Tilly 1985: 181).
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In addition to building the administrative capacity to secure power within a territory, the
process of state-building entails eliminating or neutralizing enemies inside the territory. This took
the form of establishing surveillance systems and bureaucratic forms of guaranteeing control
within the territory (Tilly 1985: 181). Emphasizing the interaction between the processes of warmaking and state-making, Sorenson writes, “Before the full consolidation of state power, would-be
rulers always had to think in terms of two-front battles, against ‘domestic’ as well as against
‘international’ opponents” (Sorenson 2001: 346). Developing the administrative state apparatus was
critical in protecting given territories from both outside intruders as well as inside enemies.
Tilly describes the protection that is provided by the wielders of coercion in the statebuilding process as a double-edged protection. Again, functioning as a racketeer, this means that
state agents produce “both the danger and, at a price, the shield against [a threat]” (Tilly 1985: 171).
Thus, governments can “commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war”
and create protective mechanism to further counter opposition (Tilly 1985: 171). Protection in the
Tillyan approach involves securing allies internally and providing protection for “domestic players
that support their rule” (Kisangani and Pickering 2014: 2). Protection of allies also means repression
of rivalries in the state (Taylor and Botea 2008: 29).
A state that is able to secure internal supporters and eliminate opposition strengthens its
capacity to extract resources (Tilly 1985: 181). Extraction, the means by which the above three
processes take place, manifests in fiscal policies and administrative capacities which allow agents of
states to penetrate society to secure human and material capital (Tilly 1985: 181, Centeno 2003: 86).
In the narrative of state-building in Europe, Tilly claims “mercantile capitalism and state-making
reinforced each other” (Tilly 1985: 170). To facilitate the capital accumulation process, rulers of the
state have to manage their relationship with the polity through concessions and negotiations:
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“Extracting financial resources requires bargaining with those controlling these resources” (Leander
2004: 5). The process of extraction thereby yields notions of rights, citizenship, and legitimacy,
which are critical in sustaining strong and stable state-society relations.
State-builders also have to provide a level of protection in order to secure legitimacy for the
process of extraction. Miguel Angel Centeno speaks further to the state's extractive power.
Borrowing the term from Michael Mann (1988), he notes that growth of state administration and
centralization provides the state with infrastructural power: “the capacity to penetrate civil society
and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Centeno 2003: 86). This
process of trade-off between rulers and the ruled also creates a body of civil servants who express
their demands to the state and play a role in building the state infrastructure (Leander 2004: 5).
The process of penetration often takes different forms: “Extraction, for instance, ranges from
outright plunder to regular tribute to bureaucratized taxation” (Tilly 1985: 181). Successful
processes of empire-building or state-building offer the opportunity to capture economies of scale.
Although most significant in capturing new trade and finance endeavors, these economies of scale
also affect industrial production. In the European experience, centralized state taxation also
channeled peasant production into the international market, further augmenting “the
opportunities for trade creation and economic specialization” (Tilly 1985: 179). Therefore,
mechanisms of mercantile capitalism that encouraged capital accumulation or extraction were
intimately linked with state consolidation (Tilly 1985: 170).
To summarize, the European experience shows a great lord engaging in effective warmaking to become dominant in a given territory. War-making entails securing human and material
capital. This leads to extractive means to secure resources needed to wage war. Securing successful
extractive means of creating violence entailed “elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the
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great lord’s local rivals” leading to the process of state-making (Tilly 1985: 183). State structures
such as military organizations, war industries, and schools also become part of the war-making and
state-building process. To sustain the state apparatus, agents of the state ally with different social
classes, particularly the ruling class. The processes of war-making, state-making, protection and
extraction converge to develop a centralized state apparatus.
Perceptions of Warfare
Contemporary literature on war and state formation establishes that war and the
preparation for war play critical roles in the development of coherent state institutions. As outlined
above, this experience confirms the reality that European states were the products of war. In other
words, the historiography of European states acknowledges warfare as a source of change and
innovation. This is not the case in the African context: “Pre-colonial African warfare- indeed
enormous swathes of non-European military history-has been categorized over the last two
centuries as ‘primitive’ or ‘tribal’” (Reid 2007:1). The vast majority of Eurocentric scholarship has
treated African warfare as “tribal” scrimmages lacking modern techniques and weaponry to quality
as a “civilized” typology of warfare: “societies which fight ‘primitive’ wars are those which are held
to be at an early stage of civilization, whose methods and technologies are crude, and whose
aspirations and visions are limited by culture and environment” (Reid 2007: 2). The nineteenthcentury literature emphasizes the endless yet meaningless nature of these primitive wars, fought by
“traditional” and “backward” societies stuck in unquestioned customs and traditions (Reid 2007: 2).
This was brought to a “blessed end” by the saving narrative of European imperialism (Markakis
2011: 2).
Such perceptions of pre-colonial African history reduce African civilizations to mere
savagery; this also serves as a way of telling the African story that legitimizes colonization. As such,
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African wars have been dismissed or regarded as “illegitimate” forms of warfare: “African war was
seen as less the mother of invention than an ongoing process of wanton destruction” (Reid 2007:
232). In the post-decolonization era, the evaluation of African states holds the general assumption
that African states are the sheer products of colonial constructs. Therefore, the Tillyan process of
state-formation fails to be tested in the region since principal relationships that sustain the state
are assumed non-existent on the continent. In other words, “Because state building in Europe is
linked to the onset of modernity and technological progress, practically in warfare, Tilly’s insights
have not been tested in Africa” (Markakis 2011: 2). Similar to the pre-colonial narrative on primitive
African wars, this has led to a complete neglect of Africa from “scholarly literature on state creation
and consolidation” (Herbst 2000: 20). Despite this general neglect, some studies have documented
the role of warfare in the rise of pre-colonial states: the Hausa Fulani in West Africa, the Zulu in
South Africa and the Mahdist state in the Sudan (Markakis 2011: 2). Similarity, the place of war in
the building of the Ethiopian state has been confirmed through some scholarship (Markakis 2011,
Zewde 1991). This paper seeks to apply Tilly’s assertions and the processes of European state
formation to the Ethiopian case-study while also noting on the social and cultural landscapes that
make national articulation a reality.
Articulation and Cultural Political Economy
In order to understand state-building in Ethiopia, it is vital to situate our understanding of
the extractive political economy as an articulated project that politically and culturally includes or
excludes certain regions and actors. In the process of state-building, “wielders of coercion” seek to
solidify the structures of the state through linking and delinking certain places from the process of
capital accumulation. Evaluating these geopolitical spaces of inclusion and exclusion in the
production process provides greater understanding into the ways states becomes politically and
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socially consolidated. Furthermore, the state is a product of socio-historical processes and cultural
landscapes that facilitate state-formation. Although Tilly provides insight into the place of war and
the political economy of extraction in institutional building, the element of culture is left out of the
discussion. In the field of political economy, Best & Paterson (2010: 2) note, the essential aspects of
culture are generally dismissed: “Political economy, as conventionally understood...fails to fully
explain its object because it abstracts political economy from its cultural constitution.” What has
caused this abstraction is explored through the writings of Karl Polanyi. As Polanyi notes in his
seminal work, The Great Transformation, the rise of the self-regulating market separated the sphere
of economics from that of politics. Therefore, contemporary neoliberal economy, a derivative of
early nineteenth century laissez-faire economics, “confronts the social, political and cultural realms
as an autonomous and self-regulating entity” (Best & Paterson 2010: 2). In other words, the fields of
economics and political economy tends to disarticulate culture from their own conceptual
apparatus, subordinating socio-political processes to the decrees of a liberalized economy. Contrary
to this idealized and disembedded project, Tsing rightly comments, “all economic forms are
produced with the diverse materials of culture” (Tsing 2009, 158). My work, therefore, is attentive
to the ways the imagining of the Ethiopian state occurs amidst articulated forms of the political
economy, which are facilitated through social and cultural realities.
These social and cultural phenomenon are partly the products of the effort to
institutionalize a free-market economy, what Polanyi constitutes as part of the liberal creed.2
Polanyi documents the activities of the economy—as an extractive activity—on human life and
nature. Recounting the consequences of free-market ideology on individuals, Polanyi notes the
separation of labor from other human and social activities. This led to the annihilation of “all
2

The creed consists of a competitive labor market, the gold standard, and international free trade (Polanyi 1944: 141).
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organic forms of existence and to replace them by a different type of organization, an atomistic and
individualistic one” (Polanyi 1944: 171). In order for the economic world to function in accordance
with the principles of the free market, traditional and social institutions had to be destroyed and
native people forced to make a living through selling their labor (Polanyi 1944: 163). This system of
extraction, the exploitive performance of the liberal economy, changed the existence of human life
through transforming a way of being and operating through one’s organic social and cultural
institutions.
Nature serves as another arena degraded by the performance of the economy. The
commodification of nature allowed for the social and institutional manifestations of the freemarket economy. Key to this institutional performance was the introduction of the real-estate
market that was vital to the utopian society proposed by the liberal creed. Within this system, land
and nature became subordinated to market mechanism (Polanyi 1944: 187). Echoing the very
themes evident in the commodification of human life, the performance of the economy upon land
and nature called for the destruction of the social and cultural systems of native peoples (Polanyi
1944: 188). Land and nature were further subordinated under the free market system through the
commercialization of soil, the mass production of food and raw materials to serve the needs of the
national, industrial economy and the opening up of international trade (Polanyi 1944: 189). Thus,
the free-market performed its dehumanizing project, detaching and depoliticizing man’s existence
and social institutions. These processes of commodification or incorporation into wider extractive
mechanisms and markets and the cultural transformation that underlines these changes will
further be evaluated in the state-formation processes of Ethiopia.
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European Imperialism in the Horn
During the 19th century, the area currently known as Ethiopia held a number of feudal
nobilities, kingdoms and principalities (Hiwet 1975: 1). Following the end of the Zemene Mesafint
(Era of Princes)3, the need for a centralized state apparatus, with greater functional and territorial
reach, became apparent (Hiwet 1975: 1). The northern highlands of Ethiopia, consisting of the
majority Amhara and Tigre ethnic groups, were known by European travelers as Abyssinia4 as early
as the sixteenth century. The ancient territory of the Abyssinian kingdom comprised the current
provinces of Tigre, Begemder, Gojjam, and parts of Shoa and Wollo (Cohen & Weintraub 1975: 11).
In the Southern5 and southwestern regions of Ethiopia, a number of ethnic groups and Oromo
kingdoms persisted with varying levels of political and social organization and evolution (Hiwet
1975:1). These 19th century political and social organizations ranged from “primitive communal
societies to states with powerful kings and elaborate mechanisms for the exercise of authority”
(Zewde 1991: 16). Today’s provinces of Wollega, Hararge, Gemu Gotta, Bale, Arussi, Illubabor, Kaffa,
and Sidamo, as well as parts of Shoa and Wollo were incorporated into the larger Abyssinian
kingdom, constituting what is today the boundaries of the Ethiopian state (Cohen & Weintraub
1975: 11). This internal consolidation and expansion took place in parallel with European expansion
in the region.

3

The era of princes, during the 18th and early 19th centuries, indicated a time of disintegration and a lack of central
authority among the ancient, Christian polity of Abyssinia (c.1769-1855). Reunification of these disintegrated political
units would later become a reality under the rulership of emperors Tewodros, Yohannes and Menelik II (Reid 2007: 11).
4
The term Abyssinia comes from the name of a tribe—“Habashat”—that inhabited the Ethiopian region during the preChristian era (Zewde 1991: 1).
5
The south or southern peoples not only denotes a geographical location; it also refers to states and people groups who
were peripheralized or excluded from the “imperial politics of Gondar” (Zewde 1991:16).
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Imperial contention for raw materials and resources began in earnest in the Horn with the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Markakis 2011: 94). In the late 19th century, laissez-faire
capitalism of the industrial revolution underwent a transformation to monopoly capitalism by
which trade was controlled or concentrated in the hands of few individuals (Hiwet 1975: 2). This
new phase of capitalism involved rapid accumulation, centralization and internationalization of
capital, destruction of the “petty manufacturer,” and the rise of the stock exchange through the
increase in the activities of companies, cartels and trusts (Hiwet 1975: 2). This period of capitalist
globalization marked the “big thinking” and performative nature of the free-market economy—of
moving from “small scale petty commerce of imagined “tradition” to large-scale manufacturing”
(Tsing 2009: 154). The greater need for cheap, raw materials and agricultural produce, which called
for a “bigness of production,” drove the scramble for colonies by European powers (Hiwet 1975: 2;
Tsing 2009: 154).
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed European imperialism and the
international capitalist economy at the door of Ethiopia’s frontiers (Crummey 2000: 226). This new
era marks the critical moment of European intervention for territorial and economic gains that will
transform the political economy and state-consolidation processes of the Ethiopian state-in-themaking. Although European interests in the region were multifaceted 6 , the main driver of
European scramble in the region was economic (Zewde 1991: 24). African markets were sought after
to deal with the excessive production of industrial goods as the result of the industrial revolution in
Europe (Zewde 1991: 24). In particular, Britain, France and Italy were all determined to seize raw
goods and materials from the Horn (Markakis 2011: 94).

6

Colonialist also had a civilizing mission to aid Africans embark on the path of “progress” and “modernity.”
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European powers facilitated this process of extraction through the introduction of certain
type of state structure. They introduced centralized, state infrastructures in their colonies and
relied on taxation and commerce to generate revenue (Crummey 2000: 227). To the west, the
British controlled the Sudan, to the south, Kenya; and, to the northeast, Somaliland (Crummey
2000: 226). Although the control of the headwaters was the principal driver of British colonial
policy in the region (i.e. Lake Victoria and Uganda), the British also pursued trade along the Baro
from the Ethiopian port of Gambela (Crummey 2000: 226). This changed the political economy of
the region, leading to parts of western and southwestern Ethiopia to become highly
commercialized; due to such changes, the province of Wallaga, in particular, rose in economic
importance (Crummey 2000: 227). This part of Ethiopia, a fertile ground for the supply of highly
demanded international products (i.e. coffee), would prove essential in filling the coffers of the
central state treasury under the emperor’s control. Through their skilled diplomacy, the French
influenced the court of Menelik II: winning a concession to build a railroad linking the city of Addis
Ababa to Djibouti (Crummey 2000: 226-227). Starting in 1917 and following the next five decades,
the railroad served as Ethiopia's main source of commercial trade and influence (Crummey 2000:
228). As Polanyi rightly notes, the commercialization of soil to meet international demands for
trade facilitate internal articulation, as shown through the Ethiopian state-in-the-making.7
Although the three imperial powers had competing objectives for colonization, they were
open to the possibility of joint action, as evidenced by the Tripartite Agreement8 signed by the
three colonial powers (Crummey 2000: 226-227). Britain's interest in the Nile Basin and France’s

7

The Impact of the railroad in later periods is further documented through the writings of Keller (1988) and Markakis
(2011).
8
Summary of principal provisions (Marcus Life and Times, pp. 204-12); see also Shiferaw Bekele, “Some Notes on the
Genesis and Interpretation of the Tripartite Treaty,” Journal of Ethiopian Studies 18 (1985): 63-79.
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desire to control the railway zone were defined clearly (Zewde 1991: 150-151). Although Italy’s
intentions were shrouded with vague language, the country took the largest claim amongst the
other colonial powers: northern region (Eritrea) and south-eastern region of Ethiopia (Somaliland).
These European colonial encroachments posed existential threats to Ethiopia and therefore
expanding the effective frontiers of the state to establish a buffer zone designed to protect the
central and northern highlands became a key priority. This process of incorporation of the
periphery into the larger Abyssinian kingdom was largely a response to European colonial
expansion and the threat it posed to Ethiopia. The following sections will narrate state-building in
the country through the interrelated processes of war-making, state-building, extraction and
protection as a Tillyan story, supplemented by discussions on the social and cultural landscape that
facilitate national articulation.
Territorial and Cultural Expansion
The acquisition of military aid from external actors, facilitated through diplomatic
maneuvering, was instrumental in the consolidation of the boundary of the modern Ethiopian
state. Congruent with the Tillyan perspective, territorial expansion also entailed securing resources
that proved essential in building the Ethiopian state. As European powers intensified their colonial
assaults in the territories of the Horn, Menelik II was aware that Ethiopia could also fall prey to
colonization. He warned, “If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I
do not intend to be an indifferent spectator” (quoted in Hiwet 1975: 6). As the only ruling province
excluded from the civil wars of the Era of Princes, the Shawan dynasty seized the power basis and
eventually imperial throne (Markakis 2011: 90). Menelik II began his expansion project as a vassal of
Emperor Yohannes and followed a pattern of territorial expansion that marked the Shawan dynasty
(Zewde 1991: 60). The mid-nineteenth century saw the great expedition of Menelik II and his
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Abyssinian counterparts to incorporate peripheral lands into the core Abyssinian empire. This
brought conquered territories into the political economy of the Ethiopian state-in-the-making and
began the imposition of the ‘high culture’ of the northern Abyssinian kingdom on conquered
territories (Markakis 2011: 98).
A strategic calculation went into conquering the lands in the periphery; incorporated
territories were integrated through different methods and to varying degrees. This was based on
the different levels of threat and benefits to political and economic state-consolidation. Forms of
incorporation were judged based on categories such as religion, structure of indigenous subsistence
production, ability to produce internationally tradable goods, and the territories strategic
importance to the imperial state (Clapham 2002: 13). Of these, Zewde notes that the desire to
control long-distance trade was probably the most important consideration (Zewde 1991: 60). These
motives prompted Gojamites and the Shewan forces to secure the Oromo Gibe region: “the green
and lush Oromo lands and their boundless commodities (gold, civet, ivory, coffee) and the
prosperous markets of Assenedbo (whose population swelled to 100,000 on market days), Embabo,
Jimma and Billo” (Hiwet 1975: 4).
The victory at the Battle of Embabo (1882) marked a critical moment for Menelik II to begin
articulating the boundaries of the Ethiopian state internally and externally. He recognized the
“external implications of his internal expansion” in light of the scramble for Africa that would take
place shortly after (Zewde 1991: 61, Hiwet 1975: 6). A month after his expedition in the South, he
pronounced to the European world: “I am happy to be able to tell you that a long and hard
campaign of seven months against the kingdoms...lying to the south and west of my dominions and
masters of the route from Shewa to Kefa, has just permitted me to subject and render tributary the
kings of Limmu, Gomma, Guma, Gera, and the Christian king of Kafa” (quoted in Hiwet 1975:6). His
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announcement to European powers confirmed the fixed borders of the Ethiopian state-in-themaking.
The Battle of Embabo made the south-west region vulnerable to Abyssinian conquest
(Zewde 1991: 62). In this process of internal expansion and consolidation of central authority,
Menelik eliminated enemies who resisted his rule or neutralized his enemies by integrating them
into the empire building project. The Oromo rulers Kumsa Moroda (later dajjazmach9 and baptised
Gabra-Egziabher10) of Leqa Naqamte, Jote Tullu (also made dajjazmach) of Leqa Qellam, Abba Jifar
II of Jimma, and the rulers of the other Gibe river states, such as Illubabor, further to the west
surrendered to Menelik with “little to no resistance” (Zewde 1991: 62). The conquest of south-west
Oromo region not only signified territorial expansion and consolidation for the Emperor but also
allowed the Emperor to secure economic gain that would strengthen his political and military
power (Zewde 1991: 62). In the Southern plateau, Shoan forces met fierce resistance from the Arsi
Oromo. Arsi leaders Suffa Kuso and Damu Usu were willing to accept the offer of internal
autonomy in return for the acknowledgement of Menelik’s suzerainty. However, the other clan
chiefs and elders remained resistant to this exchange, offering levies from different clans in the
region to muster an army against Menelik’s men (Zewde 1991: 62). Although the fight marked an
unequal struggle between arrows and firearms, the battles between Menelik’s army and Arsi
fighters lasted for four years. The final conquest of Arsi opened the way for the seizing of the citystate and commercial center of Harar in 1887 (Markakis 2011: 90).
As the incursion into Harar needed more sophisticated planning than the battle at Embabo,
Menelik dispatched one of his spies, Asme Giyorgis, to secure inside information needed for the
attack. In his assessment of European state formation, Tilly emphasizes the establishment of
9

The term is equivalent to lieutenant-general
Translates as slave of God
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surveillance systems and forms of guaranteeing control as key in the state building process.
Disguised as a Muslim merchant, Asme collected data for three months on the city-state ranging
from its “cultural life, economic conditions, number of dwellings, composition and size of
population” (Hiwet 1975: 7). Menelik made a rationale for conquest, relaying to Italy a proposal for
their co-scramble for Southern territories: “Italy was to occupy Zeila and Berbera, and Minilik was
to occupy Harar” (Hiwet 1975: 8). Two months later, he expressed his intentions of annexing all of
the territory mentioned above (Hiwet 1975: 8). Menelik led his men of 20,000 against the emir of
Harar, commanding no more than 4,000 men. The victory at the Battle of Chelenqo, January 6,
1887, marked the opening of Harar to the exploitive Shewan domination. After securing the
imperial throne in 1889, Menelik commanded forces from other Christian provinces to continue his
Southward expansion. This was briefly checked by the Italian invasion from the north, which
resulted in the Battle of Adwa (1896).
Through methods of forced incorporation and concessions, land in the periphery became
articulated into the larger Abyssinian kingdom. Territorial expansionism was embedded within the
tripartite process of what Donham (1986: 11) calls Abyssinianization: rist land-tenure system, the
establishment of Amharic as a dominant language and the proliferation and expansion of the
Orthodox Christian Church. The latter two were critical in sustaining the cultural and political
hegemony of the Abyssinian kingdom and the religious traditions of the northern, Semiticspeaking peoples while the previous instigated the systematic practice of extraction. The “Great
Tradition” of the Abyssinian kingdom, as it expanded southward, defined the national history of
Ethiopia at the cost of the historical, social and economic subjugation of colonized areas. The set of
Abyssinian ideologies and attitudes, coupled with the Orthodox religious institution and the
Amharic language, served a self-legitimizing purpose that defined the northern peoples as more
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civilized than their southern neighbors (Clapham 2002: 11). Having their cultures and traditions
condemned to second class status, conquered peoples in the south could only enter into the
political and social life of the defined Ethiopian state through adopting the lingua franca of
Menelik’s empire and through conversion to Ethiopia Orthodox Christianity (Marcus 1995: 2).
Furthermore, the Emperor used the method of name changes to Amharic to reinforce Abyssinian
hegemony. This forced an identity on conquered peoples that would erase their historical lineage
and cultural traditions. Their collective lives would now become narrated through the ‘greater’
Ethiopian historical narrative that was only defined by Abyssinian customs and traditions.
Militarization and Internal Legitimacy
Territorial and cultural expansion gave Menelik and his men the means to engage in
external war making. In the Tillyan typology, war-making involves the capacity to fight against
outside intruders by securing a monopoly over the means of coercion. In the Ethiopia case, this
process was facilitated by Menelik II’s keen ability to secure modern weaponry from European
powers. By playing the colonizing powers against each other, Abyssinian leaders secured modern
weaponry and ammunition (Markakis 2011: 92). Against Britain's arms embargo imposed on
Ethiopia, France and Italy allowed Menelik to secure sophisticated firearms. Ironically, the same
rifles and fieldpieces Italy granted to the Abyssinians as a sign of cordial friendship would later be
used against them at the battlefield of Adwa (1896). During the Battle of Adwa, the Ethiopian force
of 100,000 annihilated Italy’s army of 20,000 (Markakis 2011: 3, Hiwet 1975: 12). Among Ethiopia’s
100,000 men, “80,000 were armed with rifles, while there were nearly 9,000 cavalry as well as 42
artillery and machine-gun batteries” (Hiwet 1975: 12). The rest of the men carried all types of
weaponry, ranging from swords and lances to sabres and spears (Hiwet 1975: 12), equipped by all
possible means to ward off Italian intrusion. The fight put up by the Ethiopians was no “primitive”
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warfare but the result of state building: “Unlike the rest of the continent, European imperialism
met its match in this corner of Africa” (Markakis 2011: 3).
The building of an Ethiopian army was precipitated by the precarious security threat posed
by imperial powers: “By the turn of the twentieth century, Menelik’s army consisted of
approximately six hundred thousand riflemen and innumerable traditionally armed warriors”
(quoted in Keller 1988: 37). Before securing the throne as emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik also invited
foreign officials, mostly French and Russians, to instruct Ethiopian soldiers in the use of modern
weaponry (Keller 1988: 37). During his rule, Menelik introduced two dominant features that
contributed to the state-making process: a standing army and salary payment for soldiers (quoted
in Keller 1988: 38). Despite the efforts of the emperor to professionalize the army in lieu of
European military organization and strategies, many traditional patterns and organizations
persisted (Keller 1988: 38).
Congruent with Tilly’s core logic, this organizational feature of the Ethiopian-state-in-the
making was critical in eliminating a powerful external enemy. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s relations
with European powers during the time of Africa’s colonization and its victory over Italy planted
seeds of legitimization for Ethiopia’s state-formation process. As Clapham (2002:11) rightly notes,
Ethiopia benefited from the “the norm of sovereignty” and gained a level of recognition for
statehood through displaying its ability to secure modern weaponry (Clapham 2002: 11). In other
words, the emperor’s ability to negotiate with European powers articulated the state to outside
powers and thus, legitimated the notion of fixed Ethiopian borders. Furthermore, there was a racial
dimension to the battle that gave the victory at Adwa great significance: “It was a victory of blacks
over whites” (Zewde 1991: 81). As Ethiopia symbolized hope and independence, Blacks all over the
world rallied around this victory and gained great inspiration to fight against white domination.
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The Ethiopian state gained a level of legitimacy through such Black solidarity. In addition, the
Addis Abeba Treaty, signed after the Battle of Adwa, affirmed Ethiopia’s independence and
territorial sovereignty. Through the treaty, the northern frontiers of Menelik’s empire were clearly
defined (Hiwet 1975: 12). Through the process, Ethiopia lost access to the sea through the creation
of the colonial state of Eritrea (Crummey 2000: 226).
Although the victory at Adwa guaranteed a level of international recognition and legitimacy,
Menelik II had to think about how to further secure and stabilize his rule. In the Tillyan
perspective, protection involves securing allies internally and providing protection for domestic
players and chief supporters of the empire; this facilitates the guaranteeing of internal legitimacy.
Similar to the European experience of local magnate installment to rule different provinces, the
Ethiopian example, in particular, confirm the importance of indirect rulers in state-consolidation.
In Ethiopia, indirect rulers who occupied intermediate positions were crucial in securing
Abyssinian power in the periphery. While assimilating to the dominant culture of the Abyssinians,
local balabbats (indigenous elites who were subordinate to the lowest neftegna) served as social
bridges linking the imperial state to local inhabitants (Crummey 2000: 225). They proved crucial in
the extraction process and transferring of capital to the centre and provided a protected provincial
ruling structure: “Rulers of empires generally sought to co-opt regional and local power holders
without utterly transforming their bases of power, and to create a distinctive corps of royal
servants...whose fate depended on that of the crown” (quoted in Markakis 2011: 110) They carried
out functions of the state as “maintaining law and order, reporting crimes and apprehending
perpetrators, hearing disputes and administering traditional justice, as well as assessing and
collecting taxes.” (Markakis 2011: 110) Furthermore, the balabbats were rewarded and transformed
to a land-owning class themselves; they also usually retained a tenth of the state tax (Markakis 2011:
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110). This allowed them to secure a higher status in the newly engineered socio-economic hierarchy
(Markakis 1973: 364).
For some, submission to Abyssinian powers led to “assimilation into the Abyssinian ruling
class, and even links with the royal household” (Markakis 2011:95). In regions such as Wellegga and
Tigray, marriage with the imperial family provided the linkage of indigenous rulers to the imperial
family. Places like Jimma, which held vast Muslim population, were excluded from marriage
prospects (Clapham 2002: 13). The political nature of marriage prospects signals the cultural and
social landscape that underlined Abyssinian cultural and religious domination. Menelik used both
indigenous intermediaries and transplanted Abyssinians to rule the incorporated territories
(Markakis 2011: 4). Amhara and Tigrean naftannas, the Orthodox church and balabbats (subjected
themselves to political and cultural assimilation) aided in the development of the Ethiopian
“nation” defined under predominantly Amhara hegemony (Marcus 1995: 2). The particular use of
armed retainers and churchmen by the Ethiopian state echoes that of the European experience.
Taxation, the Gult System and Slave Trade
A key component of the process of state-formation is the process of extraction or capital
accumulation. The extraction process entails the expansion of the state’s geographical reach and
the establishment of institutions of extraction that could guarantee the collection of tax revenue. In
effect, this process entails the formation of a social contract of sorts. As such, the extraction process
is almost inextricably linked to the legitimacy of the state, since coercion alone is insufficient for
resource extraction. In Ethiopia’s state-building process, this processes evident in the areas of
taxation and law. In the 1890s, Menelik II instituted several national levies, i.e. the agricultural
tithe, and constructed a centralized department of taxation for revenue collection throughout the
regions: “No longer could provincial administrators arbitrarily forward the minimum acceptable
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amount to Addis Ababa; they had now to justify their receipts and render a full accounting”
(Marcus 1995: 3). Taxes were commonly levied after conquering a particular land and in preparation
for an upcoming external war. After securing the city-state of Harrar, for example, the emperor
imposed a compensation cost of 10,000 Maria Tereza dollars to be collected from each gate of Harar
(Hiwet 1975: 8). In the fight against Italy in the late 19th century, the emperor would impose a
special tax to pay for the importation of 100,000 carbines (Markakis 2011: 92). Taxation was also
purposed to build a national economy that linked the centralized, state apparatus to the social and
commercial developments of provincial hamlets (Marcus 1995: 3).
After the subjugation of the Southern region of Ethiopia, the building of the Ethiopian
empire was further facilitated through the implementation of the gult land system. This system
entailed “the parceling out of the conquered lands and peoples in tributary relationships to the
groups and individuals who conquered them” (Crummey 2000: 229). This land tenure policy
primarily functioned to reward or to support Menelik’s military forces. To exploit the resources of
the conquered lands remained a priority, as it proved the only way to pay the soldiery and to
maintain the imperial treasury (Markakis 2011: 97). Military garrisons or rifleman, named
naftannas, were crucial in keeping peace and security within the newly colonized spaces. The
“ethos” of the gult system became for Menelik's men “to eat” the land (Markakis 2011: 91, 97). The
new garrisons that occupied the south were supported through the tributary relationship between
the new settlers and the gebbars11 (Crummey 2000: 223). Furthermore, the rank of the garrisons
determined the number of gebbars they received; while a commander might receive a hundred, a
private might get less than five (Crummey 2000: 223). Through such economic exploitation and

11

Peasant or taxpayer who owed labor service and material tribute to the garrisons. This person was usual the male head
of a household (Crummey 2000: 223)
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social stratification, the Abyssinian rulers defined their upper class status and secured their rule in
the periphery.
The presence of ketemas (garrison towns) also became crucial for the greater security of the
Imperial authority within the provincial regions. These garrison towns were erected throughout
Ethiopia’s vast territory but were most apparent in the southern regions (Keller 1988: 39). Menelik
dispatched his “watchmen” or soldiers for the administration of conquered territories and to
mitigate any uprisings in the regions (Keller 1988: 39). Where these men were present, they also
worked to reinforce Abyssinian cultural hegemony. Compared with the naftannas, “The subject
peoples in the empire were generally seen as primitive, without culture or effective government,
and lazy, dirty, and warlike: they were naked or dressed in skins; they were heathen who needed
the word of God” (Marcus 1975: 193). If a particular soldier had an offspring by a southern woman,
the northern wife would often adopt the child into her household to raise him in Abyssinian
culture (Marcus 1975: 194). As part of this assimilation process, the status of an Oromo woman was
enhanced through becoming mistresses for a northerner (Marcus 1975: 194). These, among many,
serve as examples by which Abyssinian culture reinstated its hegemony, relegating all other peoples
are subordinate and backwards.
Further, the army or military garrisons played a central role in developing Ethiopia’s
centralized state apparatus and bureaucratic authority. Trusted generals were given important
posts such as governor-general of different provinces (Keller 1988: 38). The installment of these
men proved crucial in securing successful submission of new territories. This would later prove a
challenge as the presence of naftannas “blocked the state access to local tribute and the producers’
access to economic opportunity” (Crummey 2000: 229). In other words, the naftannas often failed
to pass on the large majority of the tributes received from their tributaries, thereby blocking the
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transfer of wealth to the imperial state (Crummey 2000: 224). Consequently, the state pursued its
own land-owning objectives through the measurement of land under the qalad (rope) system. This
made the state not only a distributor of land but also a major claimant in the process of land
allocation. Congruent with Tilly’s thesis, practices of revenue collection and the gult land-tenure
system functioned as extractive mechanisms that facilitated the building of a more centralized,
Ethiopian state.
With the naftanna-gebbar system, members of the conquered people became tillers and
servants on their own land. They were forced to surrender their production to the soldiers, the
Crown and The Ethiopian Orthodox Church (Lata 1999: 156). Although the gult system did persist
in the northern highlands previously, the system reflected a new socio-economic dimensions that
evidenced “subordination and inferiority of status” in the conquered regions (Crummey 2000: 223).
The nature of the gult system was also transformed, particularly in the southern regions, through
the introduction of the railroad in 1917. Two commodities drove the commercial exports from the
highlands: skins, hides and coffee. While skin and hides were the products of Ethiopia’s agrarian
and pastoral society, the second was key in allotting new value and importance to land. As
Crummey writes, “[Coffee] gave new value to land and reinforced efforts by the state to break down
the social relations which it had, itself, originally put in place.” (Crummey 2000: 230). This confirms
Polanyi's discussion on the social and cultural transformations produced by the free-market
system. In places such as Sidamo, Gedeo and Wallaga, coffee growing increased rapidly. Gult was
particularly converted from “direct appropriation of labor toward tribute based on agricultural
production” (Crummey 2000: 230). The railroad itself was also a great force of change. More lands
were brought into the Ethiopian empire and the holders of the lands now got the opportunities to
grow and to export coffee, becoming part of the larger economy of the Ethiopian empire and the
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global market. For the first time in the history of Ethiopia, western manufactured products were
also made available through the railroad. This gave new value to cash that previously did not exist
(Crummey 2000: 230)
Another common form of extraction during this period was Ethiopia’s involvement in the
slave trade. Menelik is noted in history as “Ethiopia’s greatest slave entrepreneur” (Marcus 1995:
73). Menelik and his wife reportedly owned 70,000 slaves (Markakis 2011: 97). This was also
common among some of the indigenous elites who served as intermediaries on behalf of the state.
Aba Jiffar of Jimma reportedly had 10,000 slaves (Markakis 2011: 97). Menelik led slaving expeditions
(razzia) around the conquered areas. His heir presumptive, Lij Yasu, forcefully dragged about
40,000 Dizi slaves to the city of Addis Ababa; almost half did not make the journey alive (Zewde
1991: 93). Both goods from the south-west and slaves were used for exchange to garner modern
weapons (Marcus 1995:73).
The practices of extraction were key in processes of power consolidation by the Abyssinian
empire. This occurred through political, economic and social processes that were embedded in
practice. The cultural and economic landscape was transformed through an extractive economy
that formed hegemonic institutions, which dictated social class formations. Subordination, cultural
annihilation and poverty became the products of policies pursued in the southern regions
(Crummey 2000: 225). The superimposition of a supposedly ‘high’ Abyssinian culture with its
“Amharic speech, Christian religion, distinctive dress, and a refined cuisine” displaced the historical
and social roots of its inhabitants (Crummey 2000: 225). Land alienation and dispossession not only
created divisions that intensified ethnic and religious differences. They also created class divisions
and social hierarchies based on property ownership and cultural superiority. Practice of the gult
land-tenure system and Ethiopia’s slave trade rightly characterize the commodification of man and
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nature. This occurred within the larger framework of a capitalist, exploitative economy brought
upon by European imperialism in the region. This also affected the cultural political economy of
the Ethiopian state-in-the-making, leading to the internal colonial practices of the Abyssinian
counterparts.
Education and Centralization
Tilly notes that the building of educational institutions serves to solidify state infrastructure.
This is particularly shown in the modernizing adventures of Menelik II as the Emperor strived to
modernize the state through the expansion of education. This provided further support for
strengthening the country’s knowledge economy and undertake the process of modernization. The
intensified relations with Europe after the Battle of Adwa in 1896 provided more educational
opportunities for Ethiopians (Zewde 1991: 103). The new intelligentsia, with French as its new
lingua franca, proved critical for the expanded state infrastructure: “The expansion of the state
apparatus...made the training of a cadre of officials imperative” (Zewde 1991: 104). Some of these
educated men would later serve as radical voices for the marginalized communities of the
Ethiopian state (Zewde 1991: 104). Missionaries sponsored most of the first educated Ethiopians;
men such as Kantiba (Mayor) Gabru Dasta of Gondar region and Onesimus Nasib of Wallaga,
served their respective peoples through increasing literacy and educational opportunities.
Education was also a site of struggle for the state seeking to balance both elements of tradition and
modernity. This is evidenced through the introduction of Menelik II School in 1908. The staff was
made up of Egyptians of the Orthodox Coptic Christian Church: “It was felt that the Copts would
filter down to their pupils a tempered version of modern ideas” (Zewde 1991: 108). The ministry of
education, although it did not function as an independent entity, developed alongside the office of
the archbishop (Zewde 1991: 109). Modern education provided both skilled individuals for the state
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apparatus and facilitated the “dissemination of ideas and change” (Zewde 1991: 109). The place of
the Church in educational institutions was also a way to sustain Abyssinian religious tradition.
According to Tilly’s argument, war-making and the processes of extraction and protection
facilitates institutional development and centralization. In 1907, Menelik announced his
consideration to create cabinet members to the outside world (Keller 1988: 40). Similar to European
cabinet formation, Menelik appointed nine ministers in the office: ministers of justice, war,
interior, commerce and foreign affairs, finance, agriculture, public works, and the ministers of the
court and of the pen (quoted in Keller 1988: 40). The minister of the Pen acted as the
emperor’s “chief secretary, archivist, and chronicler” (Marcus 1975: 228). Menelik did not select
rich aristocrats or prominent men to these posts; instead, he was keen in selecting those who
displayed loyalty to him and would thus strengthen his ultimate authority (Keller 1988: 40, Marcus
1975: 228). Despite his little reliance on their expertise, these posts signified the development of a
“secularized central bureaucracy” (Keller 1988: 40). Both the ministers and employees of the
ministers were paid salaries directly from the emperor’s treasury (Keller 1988: 40).
Menelik pursued both domestic control and international legitimacy through establishing
important policies around money and banking. Ethiopia began to mint its own currency, the first
becoming minted in Paris (Keller 1988: 40). This currency did not gain much acceptance at home or
abroad in competition with the Austrian Maria Theresa dollar (Keller 1988: 40). Another monetary
policy proposed by Menelik was the establishment of a national bank. Initiated by foreign capital,
the Bank of Abyssinia was established as an affiliate of the Egyptian bank (Keller 1988: 40). The
bank was tasked “to provide banking services in Ethiopia, produce and issue coins and notes, set up
bonded warehouses, assume custody of all money belonging to the state, and receive preferential
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rights to all state loans” (quoted in Keller 1988: 40-41). These financial institutions were crucial in
centralizing the empire and garnering control in the internal activities of the state.
There were also other features of the state such as the building of railroad, postal services,
telegraph and telephone operations, roads, bridges and hospitals that began to articulate the state
as an institution. These new infrastructures served to facilitate the extraction process from the
distant provinces and strengthened the viability of a centralized Ethiopian state (Keller 1988: 41).
Innovations around communications allowed the emperor to reinstate “rapid communication with
the outside world and facilitated administration and the dissemination of information within the
country” (Marcus 1975: 200). Infrastructures such as roads were vital for the transport of troops
and administrators while also providing the means to transport capital and human slaves that
“produced the wealth needed to swell the imperial coffers” (Keller 1988: 41). Most importantly,
these innovations provided a way for the emperor to legitimize his rule and secure his dominion
over the Ethiopian state.
Conclusion
The Tillyan perspective shows the importance of war as the primary motor for institutional
development. The interrelated processes of war-making, state-making, extraction and protection
are key to state-consolidation. Due to the history of colonization and the lack of “modern” warfare
on the continent, the predatory theory fails to be tested in the region. The case study on Ethiopia,
as one of the two African countries to have escaped colonialism, shows the relevance of predatory
theory in state formation. While the vast historical literature on Ethiopia showcases the country’s
state-formation process, there has been little theatrical approach to critically assess the country’s
state development. Through the direct application of Tilly’s account, I follow the footsteps of
Markakis (2011) who mentions the theory’s relevance in Ethiopia. Expanding on his work, I trace
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Tilly’s noted interrelated processes of war-making, state-making, extraction and protection to
further draw attention to the Ethiopian state-building experience during the time of Menelik II.
Through the interlinked processes of war-making and state-making, the Ethiopian state mustered a
sizeable army to protect the state from both global and local opposition. Furthermore, Abyssinian
rulers devised a scheme to secure modern weaponry from European powers used to defeat Italy and
conquer the lands in the periphery.
Polanyi's work on the implications of the free-market, resulting in the commodification of
human life and nature, also sheds light to the extractive means by which capital accumulation
became a reality. The examples of the gult land-tenure system, the introduction of the railroad and
the practice of slave trade serve as Ethiopia’s examples by which free-market mechanism subsumes
pre-existing political and social life in the periphery. Furthermore, assessment of the cultural
landscape of Ethiopia’s political economy confirms the embedded nature of Abyssinian high culture
and tradition in defining the Ethiopian state-in-the-making. The installation of Amharic as the
national lingua franca, marriages into the imperial throne, name changes to Abyssinian
counterparts and the influence of the Coptic Church in educational institutions all display the
social underpinnings of Ethiopia’s ‘national’ articulation. Two dominant themes, which appear in
this era but become more apparent in later periods of Ethiopian history, are that of modernization
and legitimacy. Tracing these processes in the coming historical frontiers, after the forced
achievement of a more centralized Ethiopian structure, reveal the many contradictions faced by
country and the ever-present struggle to garner both internal and international legitimacy.
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